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NO. 20 MARCH 2021 Introduction 
The Next Steps for 
EU Counterterrorism Policy 
Evolving Threats of Jihadism, Right-wing Extremism, and Transatlantic Cooperation 
Raphael Bossong 
In the wake of the Corona pandemic and the storming of the Capitol, threat percep-
tions with regard to right-wing extremists and conspiracy theories have increased 
markedly. The attacks in France and Austria last November showed that the threat 
from jihadist terrorism also remains acute. Against this background, the counter-
terrorism agenda of the European Union (EU) was updated at the end of 2020 and 
covers a broad range of topics. However, it also testifies to the heterogeneity of the 
Union’s competences and the different interests of EU member states. On the one 
hand, the EU’s role remains limited when it comes to the rehabilitation of imprisoned 
terrorists and to the broad societal prevention of extremism. On the other hand, the 
EU is pushing forward with a set of regulations to remove illegal online content. This 
common legislative agenda is also part of a renewed transatlantic partnership. How-
ever, proactive measures against right-wing terrorism will, for the time being, be 
advanced in flexible coalitions. 
 
The dismantling of the territory of the 
“Islamic State” (IS) in 2019 and intensive 
efforts by intelligence and law enforcement 
agencies to pursue terrorists mean that 
serious attacks, which occurred repeatedly 
in Europe between 2014 and 2017, have 
become less likely. Neither the so-called 
migration crisis of 2015 nor the return of 
foreign fighters from IS has resulted in an 
uncontrollable threat to Europe so far, 
although irregular immigrants and rejected 
asylum seekers have repeatedly carried out 
or attempted attacks. These acts have also 
shown that access to weapons and high-
value targets has become more difficult. 
An intelligence failure led to the Vienna 
attack in November 2020, which was per-
petrated with a Kalashnikov. By contrast, 
those who attacked the Paris editorial 
offices of Charlie Hebdo in 2015 used assault 
rifles that could be legally acquired as 
dummies in Slovakia and made functional 
again all too easily. In recent years, the EU 
states have closed this and other regulatory 
loopholes that could be exploited by terror-
ists, for example in the area of financing. 
Nevertheless, the Union is facing new risks 
that are calling its relative successes in the 
fight against terrorism into question. 
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The Continuing Threat from 
Jihadist-motivated Terror 
The Islamic State (IS, alternatively ISIL, ISIS, 
or Daesh) may regroup in Syria and Iraq. 
Major suicide bombings in Baghdad this 
January are signs of such a development. It 
is likely that IS continues to have access to 
substantial financial resources. Detained 
fighters could benefit from regional unrest 
and targeted operations to liberate them 
from prisons. EU states are still acting too 
hesitantly and incoherently when it comes 
to readmitting nationals who had joined IS. 
Orderly procedures for repatriation are 
preferable, both for normative reasons and 
in light of the security risks that arise from 
a permanent denial of responsibility and 
lack of effective jurisdiction. 
The Biden administration can help stabi-
lize the situation on the ground, as it is 
seeking to renew its partnership with Kurd-
ish allies and apparently intends to keep 
US forces in the region. The appointment of 
Brett McGurk, the former Special Presiden-
tial Envoy for the Global Coalition to Coun-
ter ISIL, as the National Security Council’s 
coordinator for the Middle East and Africa 
is another indication of the continued 
intensity and regional dimension of the 
threat. For example, groups and actors 
affiliated with IS have been able to gain a 
foothold on the African continent – appar-
ently leading to growing tensions with sup-
porters of al-Qaeda there. European states 
must therefore continue to help stabilize 
fragile countries in its wider neighborhood, 
despite many setbacks. This applies first 
and foremost to France, which faces a wide 
range of problems in the Sahel (SWP Com-
ment 5/2021). 
At home the EU has to deal with indi-
vidual jihadists and small cells that, with-
out clear links to organized structures, 
often act haphazardly, making them all the 
more unpredictable. In addition, new ideo-
logical developments must be kept in mind, 
such as a violent Takfirism. 
A particular challenge is the growing 
number of individuals who have been con-
victed in recent years for various terrorist 
offenses, including material support (e.g., 
attempts to leave the country to join IS). 
Even a comparatively low recidivism rate of 
less than 5 percent – the estimate for 
European jihadists these days – represents 
a considerable threat potential in view of 
the more than 1,400 persons currently in 
prison. Over the past two years, this threat 
has materialized in terror attacks in Vien-
na, Dresden, and London. In the aftermath, 
decision-makers have been under intense 
pressure to explain why former criminals 
were able to strike again. However, terrorist 
convicts cannot generally be locked up for-
ever without breaching fundamental prin-
ciples of the rule of law. 
Different Assessments of Trans-
national Right-wing Extremism 
The Corona crisis, meanwhile, has created a 
huge resonance chamber for conspiracy 
theories. Violent actions by radical vaccina-
tion critics are conceivable. Already long 
before the pandemic, right-wing extremist 
terrorism was markedly on the rise. When 
different forms of right-wing extremist hate 
crimes are included, one can discern a de-
crease in violent acts over the past 30 years 
in Europe. Nevertheless, there is a qualita-
tively new threat of interrelated terrorist 
attacks. 
The Christchurch 2019 attacker, by his 
own admission, was inspired by Anders 
Breivik’s deeds eight years earlier. Since 
then, several copycats have appeared on the 
scene in the United States and Germany. 
These perpetrators usually spread right-
wing extremist ideas that can be connected 
across different national and ideological 
contexts. In particular, the belief in a “Great 
Replacement,” according to which the 
white population is to be deliberately de-
stroyed by immigration, serves as a unify-
ing element. Online image boards, open 
and closed social media channels, and parts 
of the gamer scene support a culture of 
glorification of violence. However, an inten-
sified cross-border networking of right-wing 
extremist parties, organizations, and indi-
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viduals can also be observed offline, espe-
cially at sports and music events. 
Since 2019 at the latest, German politi-
cians and security authorities have been 
stressing jointly that right-wing extremism 
poses as serious a threat as militant jihad-
ism. The events on Capitol Hill in early 
January further demonstrated the growing 
scale and radical nature of conspiracy-
theory movements to a global public. None-
theless, Western states do not share a full 
or comprehensive threat perception toward 
this challenge. Right-wing populist forces 
have not marched from victory to victory in 
many democratic elections since 2017, as 
previously feared. In addition to the United 
States and Germany, explicit right-wing ter-
rorism has so far mainly been concentrated 
in Sweden, Norway, Finland, the United 
Kingdom, Italy, Spain, and Greece – and 
taken various forms in each case. Various 
Eastern European states have strong right-
wing extremist organizations but have not 
yet experienced attacks. 
Overall, there is no uniform recording of 
politically motivated acts of violence in the 
EU, despite Europol’s regular reports, which 
are supposed to include all types of terror-
ism. Hence, there is a discrepancy between 
the presumed threat potential from trans-
national right-wing terrorism and the ac-
tual shared security priorities of many EU 
states. 
The Recent EU Agenda 
The particularly serious attacks in Paris in 
November 2015 marked a turning point in 
European counterterrorism policy. Police 
and intelligence cooperation has been sig-
nificantly intensified since then. In addi-
tion, the EU decided to strengthen controls 
at its external borders and passed an ambi-
tious reform package on biometric data-
bases that can, among other things, help 
identify suspected terrorists. Many of these 
measures have yet to be implemented on 
a technical level. 
In the current EU legislative period, how-
ever, the political focus has shifted. The 
latest joint EU Security Union Strategy, 
published in summer 2020, addresses many 
aspects of the fight against terrorism, espe-
cially in the area of early detection or “anti-
cipation” – a new term in the EU’s dis-
course. However, according to this strategy, 
the most important priorities for the future 
are “hybrid threats,” cybersecurity, the pro-
tection of critical infrastructures, and deal-
ing with the impact of, as well as harness-
ing, new technologies for security authori-
ties (especially artificial intelligence and 
encryption). Meanwhile, the Schengen zone 
and the freedom of movement must be 
preserved as much as possible during the 
ongoing pandemic. 
In view of these structural challenges 
and urgent crises, the EU’s recent commu-
nications and declarations on the fight 
against terrorism adopted by the Interior 
Ministers, the Commission, and the Euro-
pean Council in November and December 
2020 are unlikely to provide a significant 
impetus. Arguably, they served primarily as 
a political signal in response to the attacks 
in France and Vienna that occurred shortly 
before, as well as the fifth anniversary of 
the Paris attacks (Bataclan). It should be 
noted, however, that the Council of EU 
Ministers of Interior explicitly welcomed a 
temporary expansion of internal border 
controls and wanted to intensify the ex-
change of information on potentially vio-
lent extremists (German “Gefährder”). This 
may influence the strategic debate on the 
future of the Schengen regime, which is to 
be held from autumn onwards, at the latest. 
Meanwhile, the intelligence exchange on 
dangerous extremists is to take place within 
the framework of a new “European police 
partnership.” This is probably the most im-
portant initiative of the past German Coun-
cil Presidency in the area of internal secu-
rity. However, this partnership cannot be 
understood as focusing primarily on the 
fight against terrorism because it covers a 
much broader field of police work, includ-
ing local cooperation in border regions. 
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The Controversial Scope of 
EU Counterterrorism Policy 
Ascribing various security policy initiatives 
to the field of counterterrorism has both 
advantages and disadvantages. On the one 
hand, such a move may accelerate and 
facilitate political decision-making. On the 
other hand, comprehensive counterterror-
ism packages create coordination and im-
plementation problems. Above all, one 
needs to avoid distorted assessments about 
the necessity and proportionality of new 
security laws in the aftermath of atrocities. 
In the early 2000s, for example, the intro-
duction of the European Arrest Warrant 
and many more measures in the Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice were justified 
on the grounds of combating terrorism. 
However, rapid progress in integration sub-
sequently entailed numerous legal chal-
lenges and repeated amendments. 
The EU’s recent counterterrorism agenda 
appears comparatively more mature. For 
example, the European Commission has 
taken up issues that a special committee of 
the European Parliament highlighted in a 
comprehensive evaluation of EU counter-
terrorism policy during the last legislative 
period. Among other things, victims of 
terrorism are to be entitled to more rights 
and compensation, while the protection of 
public spaces should be improved. In con-
trast, the European Council’s renewed call 
for mandatory data retention must be seen 
as a rather problematic priority for the next 
stage of the EU’s fight against terrorism. 
This also applies to the comprehensive 
reform of Europol’s mandate currently 
under negotiation, which aims to boost the 
technical capacities of European police 
authorities and to forge closer cooperation 
with the private sector. Some aspects of 
these legislative proposals are suitable for 
aiding the prevention and prosecution of 
serious crimes. However, if the emphasis in 
the political debate is placed on combating 
terrorism, there is a renewed risk of dis-
torted legal provisions, which could lead to 
further actions for annulment before the 
European Court of Justice. Recently, the 
Court again formulated strict conditions 
for the proportionality of mandatory data 
retention. 
Structural Gaps and Limits of 
EU Prevention Policy 
The central task of a revitalized EU counter-
terrorism policy is to contain the aforemen-
tioned structural threat potentials posed by 
jihadist and right-wing extremists. In the 
field of terrorism prevention, the EU has 
been trying to take on a coordinating role 
since the mid-2000s. In particular, the 
Commission launched the Radicalisation 
Awareness Network (RAN), which now has 
more than 3,200 members from academia, 
government, and civil society. The net-
work’s mission is to promote pilot projects 
and best practices across borders and to 
disseminate new research findings. In 2019, 
an additional steering board was set up to 
advise member states on their prevention 
policies. 
The concrete effects are unclear. This is 
exemplified by the correctional system. EU 
member states have inconsistent and un-
coordinated approaches when it comes to 
dealing with terrorist convicts. Lacking 
prison chaplaincy and underfunded reha-
bilitation programs still often characterize 
practices on the ground. The EU supports a 
professional association of correctional 
authorities that provides data on prison 
conditions, among other things. A recent 
RAN manual on the rehabilitation of ter-
rorist offenders could serve as a reference 
work. However, typical European gover-
nance instruments, such as mutual periodic 
evaluations, have not been introduced to 
date. A recommendation by the EU Council 
of Ministers in 2019 has not yet resulted in 
any noticeable consequences. 
Regardless of this, the member states 
each bear responsibility for a prevention 
and integration policy for society as a 
whole. Actions in this field require a strong 
civil society and democratic legitimacy. This 
has been demonstrated once again in recent 
months in the debates on “political Islam” 
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in Austria and France. It would not make 
sense to decide at the EU level to what ex-
tent the work of religious associations may 
be monitored or in how far their political 
participation could be deemed appropriate. 
The idea – raised briefly by President of 
the European Council Charles Michel – of 
establishing an EU training center for 
imams is equally unrealistic, as long as 
education policy remains predominantly a 
national or subnational competence. In this 
respect, it is logical that the European 
Council at the end of 2020 condemned 
attacks on freedom of expression and 
religion only in very general terms and 
urged harmony between religious educa-
tion and fundamental European values. 
Mandatory Deletion of Terrorist 
Content Online 
In turn, the EU is focusing its efforts on 
controlling the online space, where it can 
exercise strong regulatory powers based on 
the Single Market. So far, only a few Euro-
pean countries, including Germany, have 
adopted new legal regulations for the rapid 
deletion of extremist or (popularly) inflam-
matory online content. In recent years, 
security authorities have entered into 
voluntary partnerships with operators of 
major online platforms (including social 
media), with Europol taking a leading role 
with its Internet Referral Unit and the EU Inter-
net Forum, which includes representatives of 
key companies (YouTube/Google, Facebook, 
Microsoft, Twitter). In coordination with 
the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism, 
which links the same private-sector actors 
and the EU with 29 other states and the 
United Nations, jihadist propaganda has 
been reduced significantly. The main tool is 
a hashtag database that captures identified 
terrorist material and enables cross-plat-
form blocking. In October 2019, after the 
terrorist attack in Christchurch, state and 
private actors added a so-called crisis proto-
col, which should ensure the swift –and, if 
possible, worldwide – blocking of filmed 
terrorist acts. In the EU, the application of 
this crisis protocol is coordinated by Euro-
pol. 
In view of the dynamic growth of extrem-
ist online content and the large number of 
platforms that do not yet participate in 
such partnerships, the EU Commission and 
Council have been pursuing a legislative 
initiative for the mandatory deletion of 
terrorist online content since 2018. In con-
trast, the European Parliament and repre-
sentatives of industry and civil society most-
ly warned against disproportionate censor-
ship and the structural disadvantage of 
smaller online platforms that do not have 
the resources to review content and regu-
larly cooperate with security authorities. 
In the wake of the murder of the teacher 
Samuel Paty in France, which could clearly 
be traced back to incitement on social 
media, a political compromise could now 
be found: In the upcoming EU regulation, 
the strict deadline for deleting marked 
terrorist content within one hour is to be 
maintained, although certain exceptions 
apply for small providers. Similarly, the 
rule that deletions can be ordered across 
borders is maintained within the Single 
Market, with only a few ex-post review pos-
sibilities for the state in which the online 
service concerned is located. On the other 
hand, the obligation to take “active mea-
sures,” i.e., to check online content before 
it is uploaded, has been deleted. The use of 
possible terrorist content for research and 
educational purposes is also to remain per-
mitted. 
Critics nevertheless see the danger of 
illegitimate and unbalanced content con-
trols, as different standards could be applied 
to cross-border deletion requests, depending 
on the national political and legal system. 
In addition, extremist users could migrate 
to communication channels and providers 
outside of Europe that are difficult to con-
trol, such as Telegram. 
Experience to date in Germany with the 
Network Enforcement Act (NetzDG) suggests 
that at least the risks of unjustified deletion 
of legal content or the ineffective transfer 
of illegal content to unregulated platforms 
are relatively low. The disadvantage of the 
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partial migration “into the dark” is likely 
outweighed by the more limited reach of 
those alternative communication channels. 
The following points are more problematic: 
the ability of users to find and effectively 
use mechanisms to flag illegal content, the 
legal verifiability of deletion requests, and 
the tracking of offenders, since the police 
and judiciary have too few qualified person-
nel. A corresponding reform of the NetzDG, 
which also should massively increase the 
role of the German Federal Criminal Police 
Office in the prosecution of online hate 
crimes, is nearing completion – but it faces 
several legal and practical hurdles. In light 
of this example, the upcoming EU regula-
tion on deleting terrorist content will not 
be easily implemented effectively and in a 
proportionate manner in other member 
states either. 
Further EU Regulation in the Area 
of Digital Policy 
The debate on the regulation of the Internet 
or Internet-based business models is devel-
oping rapidly. The EU Digital Services Act 
(DSA), presented at the end of 2020, devel-
ops a comprehensive concept of responsi-
bility and accountability of large online 
platforms and social media. Among other 
things, uniform mechanisms for reporting 
suspected illegal content are to be estab-
lished. The dissemination of extremist or 
deliberately misleading content is to be 
countered by regulating recommendation 
algorithms. Larger platforms would have to 
provide significant transparency of their 
content control and moderation systems. 
The DSA, however, is not intended to create 
new rules to criminalize specific forms of 
content. 
In the area of jihadist terrorism, as men-
tioned, some voluntary mechanisms and 
the forthcoming EU regulation on deleting 
designated terrorist online content should 
already provide a reasonably effective set of 
tools. However, in the area of right-wing 
extremism and so-called hate speech, which 
could also fall under the regulatory scope of 
the DSA, two particular challenges arise: 
First, many actors from the online milieu 
of the “new right” use coded language that 
hides extremist content in innuendo and 
is difficult to detect using automated pro-
cedures. Second, right-wing extremist 
speech is assessed differently across EU 
member states. In 2008, the Union adopted 
a framework decision on combating racism 
and xenophobia, according to which mem-
ber states should penalize such statements. 
This weakly binding legal act from before 
the Lisbon Treaty has had little effect. 
Consideration is therefore being given 
within the Commission to extending the 
areas of crime identified in Article 83 (1) 
TFEU – for which the EU can perform a 
harmonization function – to include hate 
crimes and hate speech. However, such a 
decision would have to be unanimous in 
the Council. This is not likely, at least as 
long as tensions continue between member 
states over issues of the rule of law and the 
interpretation of the Union’s fundamental 
liberal values. The decision by Twitter and 
Facebook to ban US President Donald 
Trump from their platforms, for example, 
has prompted a reaction from the Polish 
government to plan a national law prohib-
iting such “censorship” within its sphere of 
influence. 
Unilateral action by the major online 
platforms, taking advantage of their quasi-
monopoly positions, can be critically ques-
tioned with good reason. However, individ-
ual member states are making it more dif-
ficult to arrive at a pan-European approach 
through new legal acts on the limits of ex-
pression on the Internet. This is also true 
for France, which plans to finalize the DSA 
in 2022 as part of its next EU presidency, 
but it is already pushing national laws in 
this area. 
Transatlantic Dimension 
The events at the Capitol have triggered a 
change of heart among many Democrats 
and also some Republicans when it comes 
to the traditionally very high value placed 
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on freedom of expression. Since then, there 
has been an intense debate in the United 
States about the responsibilities of large 
online platforms. Given European market 
power and the dominance of US companies, 
it would be highly advisable for Brussels 
and Washington to agree upon a coordi-
nated approach. Broadly speaking, the 
following guideline could apply on both 
sides of the Atlantic: The right to freedom 
of expression is to be largely preserved, but 
there should be no “right to amplify.” This 
would allow for curbing the dissemination 
of certain online content. 
Joe Biden addressed the danger posed by 
right-wing extremism and racism several 
times in his inaugural speech, not least to 
distance himself from the presumed tolera-
tion or even support of such groups (e.g., 
the Proud Boys) under Donald Trump. 
However, US authorities already banned a 
right-wing extremist organization, the so-
called Russian Imperial Movement, as a 
foreign terrorist association for the first 
time in 2020. It is all the more surprising 
that there is still no federal legislation to 
prosecute domestic terrorist groups, as 
such. If this gap were to be closed under the 
Biden administration, global cooperation 
against right-wing extremist and potential 
terrorist actors could gain substance. 
In view of the different threat situations 
and perceptions of right-wing terrorism in 
various European states, however, flexible 
bilateral or mini-lateral initiatives are to 
be expected for the time being, especially 
when it comes to operational cooperation 
between criminal justice authorities and 
intelligence agencies. Germany, in partic-
ular, has an important European leadership 
role to play. It is particularly affected by 
right-wing extremism and right-wing terror-
ism and also has developed special compe-
tencies in this area. It should draw on this 
profile to revitalize transatlantic relations. 
This also applies to the future security rela-
tionship with the United Kingdom, which 
already classified domestic right-wing ex-
tremism as a strategic threat several years 
ago. 
Conclusion and 
Recommendations 
Despite years of effort, the EU has reached 
structural limits with regard to broad, all-
of-society efforts to curb extremism and 
prevent terrorist violence. Within the EU, 
member states should not drag each other 
into internal debates about the role of 
religion and integration in their respective 
societies. Rather, more targeted efforts can 
be made at the EU level to create reform 
incentives in specific areas, such as preven-
tion and rehabilitation in national correc-
tional systems. Even without a competence 
for legal harmonization, the EU can do 
more than promote best practices. 
At the top of the agenda, however, is 
how to reach a shared understanding on 
the limits freedom of expression and on the 
legal responsibilities of online platforms 
and service providers. EU member states 
must continue to work in the long term on 
approximating their criminal laws on hate 
speech. First, the implementation of the 
upcoming regulation on deleting terrorist 
content online must be closely monitored. 
To avoid a disproportionate use of the ter-
rorism charges in cross-border contexts, it 
would be helpful to expand the legal bases 
for combating hate speech and hate crime. 
In the medium term, the DSA will create 
pressure to act in this direction, as cross-
border notifications and deletion orders are 
likely to increase sharply. The consequences 
of the DSA will extend far beyond counter-
terrorism and beyond EU borders. There-
fore, the converging perception of right-
wing extremism being a threat in the United 
States must be used now as an opportunity 
for a transatlantic regulatory framework. 
Yet all these steps to regulate the online 
space can only indirectly impact on differ-
ent types of religious and political extrem-
ism. Most research studies on radicalization 
processes and terrorist acts show that on-
line communications play an important 
and growing role, but that personal, social, 
and political factors remain at least as 
crucial. 
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Since right-wing terrorism has so far only 
been experienced as a priority threat in a 
minority of Western states, flexible formats 
should be used to move operational coop-
eration forward. This applies, for example, 
to intelligence exchanges on right-wing ex-
tremists or to concrete measures that may 
have cross-border aspects, such as bans on 
associations and investigative procedures. A 
comparable pattern of counterterrorism 
cooperation among “most affected member 
states” was already used in the early 2010s 
against the phenomenon of IS foreign 
fighters – and could later be transformed 
into common European approaches. Now 
again, the EU can benefit from committed 
member states such as Germany and third 
countries such as the United Kingdom and 
the United States to advance with tangible 
counterterrorism measures. 
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